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A D M I R A LT Y
What Is the Meaning of a “Safe Berth” Clause in a Charter Party?
CASE AT A GLANCE 
Ships are leased pursuant to contracts known as “charter parties.” Like most form contracts, charter
parties contain a great deal of “boilerplate.” In this case, the Supreme Court must decide whether a “safe
berth” clause guarantees a ship’s safety or merely imposes a duty of care on the lessee (“charterer”).


CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. v. Frescati Shipping Co., Ltd.
Docket No. 18-565
Argument Date: November 5, 2019
From: The Third Circuit
by Robert M. Jarvis
Nova Southeastern University College of Law, Fort Lauderdale, FL

INTRODUCTION
Parties that lease ships typically do so on preprinted forms known
as “charter parties.” Like most commercial contracts, charter
parties contain numerous boilerplate clauses. One such clause
is a “safe berth” clause, which requires the lessee (called the
“charterer”) to send the ship only to docks it can reach safely.
Such a clause resembles, and often is combined with, a “safe port”
clause, which requires the charterer to send the ship only to ports
it can reach safely.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, based in New
York, views such clauses as guarantees:
[T]he charterer bargains for the privilege of selecting
the precise place for discharge and the ship surrenders
that privilege in return for the charterer’s acceptance of
the risk of its choice.
Park S.S. Co. v. Cities Service Oil Co., 188 F.2d 804 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 862 (1951). See also Venore Transportation Co.
v. Oswego Shipping Corp., 498 F.2d 469 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 998 (1974); Ore Carriers of Liberia, Inc. v. Navigen Co., 435
F.2d 549 (2d Cir. 1970); Paragon Oil Co. v. Republic Tankers, S.A.,
310 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 967 (1963).
In contrast, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, located
in New Orleans, considers these clauses to be merely promises
that the charterer will do its best to send the ship to safe locations:
[N]o legitimate legal or social policy is furthered by
making the charterer warrant the safety of the berth it
selects. Such a warranty could discourage the master on
the scene from using his best judgment in determining
the safety of the berth. Moreover, avoiding strict liability
does not increase risks because the safe berth clause
itself gives the master the freedom not to take his vessel
into an unsafe port.
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Orduna S.A. v. Zen-Noh Grain Corp., 913 F.2d 1149 (5th Cir. 1990).
The same conclusion has been reached by trial courts in the
Fourth and Ninth Circuits. See In re Jubilant Voyager Corp.,
S.A. of Panama, 1983 WL 589 (E.D. Va. 1983); California ex rel.
Department of Transportation v. S/T Norfolk, 435 F. Supp. 1039
(N.D. Cal. 1977).
In the present case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
headquartered in Philadelphia, adopted the Second Circuit’s
position:
We are persuaded that the Second Circuit’s longstanding
formulation of the safe berth clause is the one we should
follow….
To the extent the Fifth Circuit in Orduna deviated from
this well-established standard, we are not persuaded by
its reasoning and decline to follow the course it charted.
Hence we conclude that the safe berth warranty is an
express assurance made without regard to the amount of
diligence taken by the charterer.
In re Frescati Shipping Co., Ltd., 718 F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 2013)
(citations and footnotes omitted). Thus, it now is up to the U.S.
Supreme Court to decide whether the Third Circuit made the
right choice.

ISSUE
Is a “safe berth” clause in a charter party a guarantee, or merely
a promise, that the charterer will send the owner’s ship to a safe
dock?

FACTS
On November 26, 2004, the 748-foot Cypriot oil tanker Athos I
was nearing the end of a 1,900-mile journey from Puerto Miranda,
Venezuela, to a CITGO refinery in Paulsboro, New Jersey, just
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across from the Philadelphia International Airport. When it was
within 900 feet of the dock, however, it struck an abandoned nineton iron anchor. The allision ripped two holes in the Athos I’s hull
and caused 200,000 barrels of crude oil to be released into the
Delaware River.
Following the accident, Randive, Inc., a New Jersey salvage
company, managed to retrieve the anchor. Despite a formal
investigation by the U.S. Coast Guard, the anchor’s owner was
never identified. Likewise, the Coast Guard was unable to say how
long the anchor had been lying on the river’s bottom. See https://
www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/5p/CG-5PC/INV/
docs/documents/AthosI.pdf (at page 38).
At the time of the mishap, the Athos I was owned by Frescati
Shipping Company, Ltd. (a Cypriot firm) and managed by Tsakos
Shipping & Trading, S.A. (a Greek company). In 2001, Tsakos had
“time-chartered” the Athos I into a “tanker pool” assembled by
Star Tankers, Inc. of Connecticut. Thus, when CITGO needed a
vessel to carry its oil, it “voyage-chartered” the Athos I from Star.
Frescati ended up paying $143 million to decontaminate the river
and settle the claims of various third parties (including a nearby
nuclear power plant that was forced to temporarily shut down).
Because the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2761,
caps the liability of shipowners, the U.S. government (USG)
reimbursed Frescati $88 million. This money came from the Oil
Spill Liability Trust Fund, which is financed by a tax on petroleum
products.
To recover their respective costs, Frescati and the USG sued
three CITGO entities (collectively, “CARCO”): CITGO Asphalt
Refining Company, CITGO East Coast Oil Corporation, and CITGO
Petroleum Corporation. These claims were consolidated with
Frescati’s lawsuit seeking exoneration under the Shipowner’s
Limitation of Liability Act of 1851, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501–30512.
In 2011, following a 41-day nonjury trial, Senior District Judge
John P. Fullam of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania ruled that CARCO had no liability, either in contract
or in tort, to Frescati and the USG. See In re Frescati Shipping
Co., Ltd., 2011 WL 1436878 (E.D. Pa. 2011). In the meantime, the
Athos I had been sold to scrap dealers (for $9.4 million) and
dismantled by shipbreakers in Bangladesh.
On appeal, the Third Circuit, in an opinion by Circuit Judge
Thomas L. Ambro, partially affirmed and partially reversed. See
In re Frescati Shipping Co., Ltd., 718 F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 2013).
Unlike Judge Fullam, Judge Ambro concluded that Frescati was a
third-party beneficiary of the safe berth clause contained in the
Star-CARCO voyage charter party. As such, he remanded for a
determination of whether CARCO had violated the clause. He also
directed Judge Fullam to consider whether CARCO had met its
tort law “duty of care.” Although CARCO appealed Judge Ambro’s
decision to the Supreme Court, it declined to hear the case. See
CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. v. Frescati Shipping Co., Ltd., 571 U.S.
1197 (2014).
By now, Judge Fullam had retired, so the case was reassigned
to District Judge Joel H. Slomsky, who held an additional 31
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days of hearings before finding that CARCO had 1) breached the
safe berth clause and 2) failed to search for obstructions in the
approach to its dock, thereby failing to fulfill its tort law duty of
care. See In re Petition of Frescati Shipping Company, Ltd., 2016
WL 4035994 (E.D. Pa. 2016). As a result, he awarded Frescati
100 percent of its requested damages ($71.5 million).
Judge Slomsky also awarded damages to the USG, but reduced its
claim by 50 percent due to the USG’s failure to discover the nearly
seven-foot-long anchor. Judge Slomsky considered this fair given
that the anchor had been resting in the Mantua Creek Anchorage,
a government-controlled waterway better known as Federal
Anchorage Number Nine, for likely decades. Accordingly, Judge
Slomsky granted the USG $48.6 million.
On appeal, the Third Circuit, in an opinion by Chief Judge D.
Brooks Smith, once again affirmed in part and reversed in part.
See In re Frescati Shipping Co., Ltd., 886 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 2018).
Although agreeing with most of Judge Slomsky’s decision, Chief
Judge Smith held that CARCO had not violated any tort duty. This
conclusion, however, had no effect on Frescati’s judgment: “Both
theories of liability independently support the District Court’s
judgment against CARCO. As a result, our decision to affirm the
judgment based on CARCO’s contractual liability [i.e., the safe
berth clause] means that we are not required to delve into the
District Court’s tort analysis.”
Turning to the USG’s claim, Chief Judge Smith held that Judge
Slomsky had erred by reducing it: “When, as here, the plaintiff
seeks relief on a contract, the defendant may not resort to
equitable recoupment as a means to assert a non-contractual
claim, whether sounding in an equitable-balancing analysis, in
tort, or otherwise.” Thus, Chief Judge Smith remanded the case
to Judge Slomsky “for the purpose of recalculating [the USG’s]
damages and prejudgment interest.”
Upon receiving Chief Judge Smith’s decision, CARCO filed a
new petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. This time,
the Court granted it. See CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. v. Frescati
Shipping Co., Ltd., 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019). On August 5, 2019, the
Court granted CARCO’s motion to dispense with printing the joint
appendix. See CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. v. Frescati Shipping Co.,
Ltd., 2019 WL 3538073 (U.S. 2019).

CASE ANALYSIS
Charter parties are agreements under which one party (the
owner) leases its ship to another party (the charterer). The term
charter party comes from the Latin phrase “charta partitia,”
meaning “divided document.” Early charter parties were cut in half
after signing, to allow each party to retain a copy.
There are three basic types of charter parties: time, voyage, and
demise. In a time charter party, the owner agrees to lease the
vessel for a set period (typically one year). In a voyage charter
party, the owner agrees to lease the vessel for a specific voyage.
Demise charter parties are used almost exclusively in the
financing of new vessels. Such charter parties tend to run 20 to
30 years, which is the normal working life of most vessels. (At the
time of her scrapping in 2008, the Athos I was 25 years old.)
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In both time and voyage charters, the crew is provided by the
owner. In demise charters, the crew is provided by the charterer.
As a result, demise charters also are known as “bareboat” charters.
Most charter parties give the charterer the right to sub-charter
(i.e., sublease) the vessel to third parties. Such third parties are
known as sub-charterers. When a charter party “string” has a subcharterer, it is common to refer to the actual owner as the “head
owner” and the charterer as the “disponent owner” to reflect its
dual role.
Charter parties typically are arranged by independent brokers,
although large companies often have their own in-house brokers.
In rare instances, parties take the time to negotiate charter
parties from the “ground up.” Such charter parties are known
as “homegrown” charter parties. More commonly, parties use
preprinted forms that require only a few key terms (such as the
name of the ship, the dates of deployment, and the “hire,” or
rental, price) to be filled in. If the parties wish to change any of
the preprinted clauses, or add any special provisions, they do so by
attaching amendments called “rider” clauses.
Star leased the Athos I to CARCO on a preprinted charter
party known as “ASBATANKVOY.” Promulgated in 1977 by the
Association of Ship Brokers and Agents (U.S.A.) Inc. (ASBA)
(www.asba.org), a leading trade group, ASBATANKVOY now is the
main form used to voyage charter oil tankers. Its popularity has
been attributed to the balanced nature of its terms.
In pertinent part, the ASBATANKVOY safe berth clause (paragraph
9) reads as follows:
The vessel shall load and discharge at any safe place or
wharf, or alongside vessels or lighters reachable on her
arrival, which shall be designated and procured by the
Charterer, provided the Vessel can proceed thereto, lie at,
and depart therefrom always safely afloat….
At page 7 of its brief urging the Supreme Court to hear CARCO’s
appeal, ASBA pointedly declined to say whether it intended its
handiwork to be read as a guarantee or merely a promise:
Amici express no view on the proper interpretation of
the safe-berth clause here. When the party that actually
causes a loss—in this case, the party that abandoned
the anchor that later damaged the Athos I—cannot
be identified, some innocent party must bear the risk.
Because the charterer typically nominates the berth, it
would be entirely rational to construe a safe berth clause
to impose an absolute warranty, thus allocating the loss
to the charterer when both parties are innocent. It would
also be entirely rational to construe a safe-berth clause
to impose only a due-diligence obligation. That would
have the effect of imposing the loss on the owner if the
charterer exercised reasonable care to discover any
conditions that might render the berth unsafe for the
vessel.
However the safe-berth clause is construed, it is
important for both parties to have a clear understanding
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of the risks they bear when they enter into a transaction.
Whether this Court affirms or reverses the judgment
below, therefore, it should grant the petition and rule on
the merits. Only if the result is clear in advance will the
parties obtain the benefit of the risk allocation for which
they bargained when they concluded the charterparty.
As noted above, the Second Circuit believes that a safe berth
clause is a guarantee, while the Fifth Circuit considers it a mere
promise. Over the years, academic commentators have lined up
behind the Second Circuit, with one notable exception. In their
oft-cited hornbook The Law of Admiralty (2d ed. 1975), Yale Law
School Professors Grant Gilmore and Charles L. Black Jr. argued
that others had “gone too far” in characterizing a safe berth clause
as a guarantee.
In addition to Orduna and Professors Gilmore and Black’s treatise,
CARCO relies heavily on Atkins v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 2 F.
Cas 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 601), aff’d, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 272
(1873). In Orduna, the Fifth Circuit concluded that by adopting
the district court’s opinion on the merits, the Supreme Court in
Atkins signaled that safe port clauses (and, by extension, safe
berth clauses) are promises and not warranties. However, even
a cursory reading of the trial court’s decision in Atkins makes it
clear that it stands only for the proposition that such clauses are
waived in the absence of a timely protest:
If, then, the port named [i.e., Port Morant in Jamaica]
was deemed an unsafe port…and so not within the
privilege given by the charter, it was the duty of the
master, as the sole representative of the owners, to have
made known his objections at the time. Not having done
so, he must be deemed to have waived the right to object,
and, the condition having been waived, no action can
now be maintained for the breach of it.
Atkins, 2 F. Cas. at 79.

SIGNIFICANCE
As ASBA notes, it matters little how the Supreme Court rules
in this case (except, of course, to the parties, who have a lot of
money riding on the outcome). If the Court follows the Second
Circuit, then charterers will be strictly liable when they send ships
to specific docks. Conversely, if it sides with the Fifth Circuit, then
charterers will be only presumptively liable for their choices. In
either event, the risk will be priced into the insurance premiums
that owners and charterers pay, and any added costs will be passed
on to their customers.
What is interesting about this case is that it is the fourth admiralty
appeal the Court has heard in the past two years. Last term,
of course, the Court decided three admiralty cases: The Dutra
Group v. Batterton, 139 S. Ct. 2275 (2019) (punitive damages
are unavailable in unseaworthiness cases) (previewed at 46:6
at 26–29); Parker Drilling Management Services, Ltd. v. Newton,
139 S. Ct. 1881 (2019) (maritime law, rather than state law,
regulates wages on the Outer Continental Shelf) (previewed at
46:7 at 11–13); and Air and Liquid Systems Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S.
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Ct. 986 (2019) (seamen can sue manufacturers of marine parts
that turn out to be dangerous) (previewed at 46:1 at 37– 40).
At one time, the Court’s docket was filled with admiralty disputes,
but since the 1970s, it has shown little interest in the field.
That the Court suddenly has become reengaged is particularly
surprising when one considers that its docket, which used to
average 150 cases per year, now routinely fails to reach 75 cases
per year.
There is no ready explanation for the Court’s rediscovery of
admiralty, and the recent surge may just be a fluke. On the other
hand, this trend—if it is a trend—bears watching and may
indicate that it is becoming increasingly difficult for the Court to
muster enough votes to take on more controversial matters.
Robert M. Jarvis is a professor of law at Nova Southeastern
University and a past editor of the Journal of Maritime Law
and Commerce. He can be reached at jarvisb@nova.edu or
954.873.9173.
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